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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
ARNIE R. GREEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
THE LANG COMPANY, INC., a Cor-

CaseN~.

poration, LEONARD CHIPMAN
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, a Corporation, JULION CLAWSON, SR., and
JULION CLAWSON, JR.,

7262

Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
This is an appeal from a judgment made and entered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, LEONARD
CHIPMAN LIVESTOCK COMPANY, a Corporation, JUL.
ION CLAWSON, SR., and JUL10N CDA!WSON, JR. The
case was tried before the Honorable Judge A. H. Ellett, sitting without a jury. At the conclusion of the evidence he
found the issues in favor of the plaintiff and allowed him
general and special damages in the sum of $3,030.00, but
deducted therefrom the sum of $1,250.00 which had been
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paid by defendant, Lang Company Incorporated, to the
plaintiff in consideration of a covenant not to sue said
Lang Company by the plaintiff and a dismissal of the action
as to it.
STATE~MENT

OF FACTS

The following facts were either duly admitted by the
defendants Leonard Chipman Livestock Company, a corporation, Julion Clawson, Sr., and Julion Clawson, Jr. or
were undisputed in the evidence : That the Leonard Chipman Livestock Company is and was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
State of Utah and engaged in a general ranching business,
with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah;
that the defendant, Julion Clawson, Sr., is a resident of
Salt Lake City and President of said Leonard oChipman Livetock Company; that Julion Clawson, Jr., is a minor of the
age of 15 years, and is a son of defendant, J ulion Clawson,
Sr.; that Second South Street is a paved, public highway
extending in a generally easterly and westerly direction
through Salt Lake City, Utah; that Seventh West Street
is likewise a paved, public highway extending in a generally northerly and southerly direction through said city;
that the defendant, Leonard Chipman Livestock Company,
a corporation, had purchased from the Lang Company, Inc.,
a corporation, certain iron casings, and that the said Leonard
Chipman Livestock Company, acting through its President,
Julion Clawson, Sr., on or about June 16th, 1947, directed
the defendant, Julion Clawson, Jr., to drive a truck which
was the property of said Leonard Chipman Livestock Com-
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pany, to said Lang Company, Inc., and there obtain said
casings; that said Julion Clawson, Jr., drove said truck to
said Lang Company, Inc., and the agents, servants and employees of said Lang Company, Inc., loaded the casings onto
said truck; that said truck so loaded was driven by the said
Julion Clawson, Jr., to the place of business of Salt Lake
Transportation Company and there the said J ulion Clawson,
Sr., inspected said load and concluded that the said truck
was not properly loaded and directed the said J ulion Clawson, Jr., to drive said truck to said Lang Company, Inc., and
have said truck reloaded, and that the said J ulion Clawson,
Jr., as directed did drive said truck to the said Lang Company, Inc., place of business and had said truck reloaded, and
certain of said pipe removed therefrom; that at said time
the said Julion Clawson, Jr., was a minor of the age of 15
years and had no license, permit or authority to drive said
truck or any other motor vehicle, all of which the Livestock
Co. and the Clawsons well knew.
That there was on said truck at the time that said
Julion Clawson, Jr., drove said truck to the Lang Company,
Inc., the first time and when he left said Lang Company,
Inc., and when he returned thereto, an automobile rim with
a tube and tire thereon, which is hereafter referred to as
a wheel, which was the property of said defendant, Leonard
Chipman Livestock Company and was an accessory to said
truck, and when necessary, could and was used by said
company as an extra wheel for the truck; that there was
no rack or other place especially provided to carry said
wheel on said truck and the same was usually carried on
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the floor of the truck but with the casings thereon said
wheel could not be placed on the floor of the truck.
That when said Lang Company, Inc., reloaded said
pipe, the employees of said Lang Company placed said
wheel between the back of the cab and a stake projecting
from a slot. That at said time the said Julion Clawson, Jr.,
saw the manner in which said wheel was placed on said
truck and asked the employee of said Lang Company, Inc.,
who had reloaded said pipe if said wheel would be safe, and
received the reply that he, the said employee, thought it
would be safe; that said wheel was not secured in any manner and was in such condition and position on said truck
that in the driving of said truck the pipe thereon could and
did move against the same.
That the said, Julion Clawson, Jr., with the said
pipe so reloaded and the said wheel so placed on said truck
drove from said Lang Company, Inc., on said Second South
Street and towards the intersection of said Second South
and Seventh West Streets aforesaid, a distance of approximately five city blocks; that in driving said truck he drove
at a speed varying from 15 to 2~5 miles per hour; that at
various places along the course of travel the said road was
rough and bumpy; that the driving of said truck over said
highway at the rate of speed which it was driven caused
the said pipe so loaded on said truck to move against said
wheel and it became loosened from its position between the
back of the cab and the stake, and was thereby caused to
roll and fall from the truck and injure plaintiff.
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That the said Julion Clawson, Jr., drove said truck
at a rate of speed that was not reasonable or proper under
the circumstances and he was guilty of negligence in driving at such rate of speed in view of the condition of the
highway, the load upon said truck and the manner in which
' said wheel was placed thereon.

That the plaintiff on said 16th day of June, 1947,
was in the employ of Salt Lake City and was engaged in mixing paint preparatory to painting certain marks and lines
upon said Second South Street immediately west of said
__ intersection, and that while doing said work he was in the
course of his employment, and while so working said wheel
by reason of the negligent manner in which said truck was
driven and operated by the said defendant, Julion Clawson,
Jr., as heretofore set forth, fell therefrom and struck upon
-· and against plaintiff's right leg, thereby causing a comminuted fracture of the bones of said leg between the knee
and the ankle.
That plaintiff was immediately taken to the Holy
- Cross Hospital where he was confined from said 16th day
of June, 1947, until the 25th day of June, 19-47; that he was
compelled to expend for said hospital care and treatment the
sum of $153.00; that by reason of his said injuries he was
compelled to and did receive surgical and medical care and
attention and has paid therefor the sum of $277.00. That at
the time of receiving said injuries he was earning $200.00
·~ per month and that he was unable to do any work whatever
-~ for a period of five and one-half months, to his further
damage in the sum of $1100.00, a total of special damages
of $15-30.00.
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The Court allowed general damages in the sum of
$1500.00, a total in all of $3030.00.

The evidence showed that the plaintiff, together -~
with Willard Hanson, his attorney, on or about the 7th day ;_
of June, 1948, and prior to the trial herein, entered into an
agreement with the Lang Company, Inc., a corporation,
whereby for the consideration of $1250.00, the plaintiff dismissed said action without prejudice against said Lang
Company, Inc., and agreed not to sue or prosecute or make
any claims or demands against the Lang Company, Inc., a _::
corporation, by reason of his injuries, and they agreed fur- _;
ther to indemnify and save said company harmless for any
claim that the said defendants, Leonard Chipman Livestock :-J
Company, a corporation, Julion Clawson, Sr., and Julion -:~·
Clawson, Jr., or any of them, might make against said Lang
Company, Inc., by reason of said accident and injuries to
plaintiff.
1

The plaintiff duly filed his objections to the Findings
and Conclusions of the Court and submitted Findings, Conclusion and a Judgment which he claimed reflected the law
and the evidence in the case. In these Findings, Conclusion
and Decree he proposed that the Livestock Company and
the two Clawsons were liable for the full amount of the
judgment and that The Lang Company was in no way liable
or responsible for the accilent or injuries to him. It was
the plaintiff's contention during the trial of this matter and
it is his contention on this appeal that the Court erred in
Findings and Conclusions that The Lang Company was a
joint tort-feasor with the other defendants; the only pur-
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pose of this appeal so far as the plaintiff is concerned, is to
have this Honorable Court determine whether or not the
defendant, The Lang Company was a joint tort-feasor with
the other defendants and whether the payment by it of the
$1250.00, on a covenant not to sue should be allowed the
other defendants.

STATEMENT OF ERRORS
The Court erred in finding that the defendant, The
Lang Company, was a joint tort-feasor with the other defendants.
1.

2. The Court erred in refusing to make and enter the
Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Judgment and De"· cree as proposed by the plaintiff.
3. The Court erred in allowing the defendant, Livestock Company and the Ciawson defendants a set-off for
the amount paid by The Lang Company in consideration
.. of the covenant not to sue.

ARGUMENT

For the purpose of this argument all of the above errors
may be considered together. If the defendant, The ~Lang
~· Company was a joint tort-feasor with the other defendants
- then the other defendants would be entitled to an off-set or
, credit against the judgment for the amount paid by The Lang
;:z Company.
~-

It is the plaintiff's contention that The Lang Company
is not a joint tort feasor and in no way proximately con-
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tributed to the accident or injury to the plaintiff; that the
loading upon the truck of the wheel by the employees of '
The Lang Company was not a part of the business which
the defendants had with the Lang Company and that merely
because the employees of The Lang Company took it upon
themselves to load the wheel could not in any way bind The
Lang Company, it being without the scope of their employ- '1j
ment. Further it will be remembered that the defendant
Julion Clawson, Jr., drove and operated the truck a distance
of approximately five blocks before the wheel fell from the
truck and that even though it might be said that The Lang
Company was responsible for the loading of the wheel at
its place of business and was negligent in so loading it, such
negligence is so remote and so far removed from the time
of the accident that it cannot be said to be a contributing ··
factor thereto. The Livestock Company had purchased the
pipe from The Lang Company and had sent its truck there
to have the pipe loaded upon it. The loading of the wheel
upon the truck was not ~ part of the contract or the business
which the Livestock Company had with The Lang Company.
It was merely an accommodation rendered to the Livestock
Company and the other defendants by the employees of H
The Lang Company.

In other words the sole and only question involved in
this case is whether or not the negligence of The Lang ,
Company, if any, in loading the wheel upon the truck of
the other defendants, was the proximate or contributing l~
cause of the injury sustained by the plaintiff or was it a
remote cause or was the negligence of the other defendants
in driving the truck too fast over a bumpy road the sole

I

I

~
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proximate cause of the accident and injury sustained by
plaintiff. Ordinarily the question of proximate cause is
one of fact for the jury or the court sitting without a jury.
This court so held in the case of Anderson vs. Bransford,
39 Utah 256, 116 Pac. 1023. There the court held that
this is so because different conclusions generally arise on
a conflict of the evidence or because of different deductions
or inferences arising from the undisputed facts, in respect
to the question of whether the injury was the natural and
probable consequences of the proved negligence or wrongful
act, and ought to have been foreseen in the light of the
attending circumstances. But the court further held, in
the cited- case, that where there is no conflict and where
but one deduction or inference is permissible then the question of proximate cause is one of law.

It is the contention of the plaintiff in the case at bar
that there is only one permissible inference and that is that
the direct and proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff
was the negligence of the defendants, Leonard Chipman
Livestock Co., Julion Clawson, Sr., and Julion Clawson, Jr.
and that but for their negligence plaintiff would not have
been injured and that no negligence on the part of the defendant, The Lang Company, caused or produced or set
in motion or concurred in the negligence of the other defendants.
Proximate cause has been defined by this court in the
case of Strong vs. Granite Furniture Company, 77 Utah 292,
294 Pac. 303, 78 A. L. R. 465, as follows:
"The proximate cause of an injury is the primary
moving cause without which it would not have been
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inflicted, but which, in natural and probable sequence
of events, and without the intervention of any new or
independent cause, produces the injury."
The question arises as to whether or not the acts of negligence upon the part of the defendants Livestock Co. and
Clawsons were intervening or independent causes which
produced the injury to the plaintiff and were thus the proximate cause relieving The Lang Company from liability.
The negligence of The Lang Company, if any, is too
remote to constitute the proximate cause or a proximate con..
tributing cause of plaintiff's injury. The case of Strong vs.
Granite Furniture Company (supra) is a good example of
the problem in question. In that case the defendant Furniture Company had gone to the plaintiff's home to there repossess furniture and in the act of repossessing the same,
according to the plaintiff's contention, had entered the plaintiff's home by unfastening a window through which its
employees entered the house, that upon leaving the house
with the furniture, the defendant had failed to relock the
window and that because of such failure some person unknown to either the plaintiff or defendant, entered plaintiff's home and carried away certain personal property of
the plaintiff of the value of $500.00 The court held that the
negligence of the defendant in leaving the window unlatched
was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's loss but that the
intervening act of the person who carried away plaintiff's
property was the proximate cause and was an independent
act that could not be reasonably foreseen by the defendant.
The Restatement of the Law of Torts, Chap. 16, P. 828,
Sec. 441, says, "An intervening force is one which actually
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operates in producing harm to another after the actor's negligent act or omission has been committed." In other words,
a prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish
the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury
was made possible, if there intervened between such prior
or remote cause and the injury, a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury, even though such
injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion.

.:-

A good example of the above statement is the case of
Anderson vs. Bransford, (supra). In that case the plaintiff
went to the rear of the defendant's apartment house to deliver some laundry. In order to reach the rear of the building it was necessary for her to go along a narrow alleyway,
at the side of which was an unguarded cellar way. Plaintiff
had delivered the laundry and was returning to the street
by way of the alley when she encountered a horse and wagon
near the open cellar way. The horse made a movement which
frightened the plaintiff and the plaintiff in attempting to
get away from the horse, fell into the unguarded cellar way.
The court held that the unguarded cellar way was but a
condition which, under the circumstances of the case, exposed the plaintiff to no danger and would have produced
no damage or injury to her had it not been for the independent, unrelated, direct and efficient cause of the plaintiff
being frightened by the horse and falling into the unguarded
cellar way. In the case at bar the loading of the wheel upon
the truck by the defendant, The Lang Company, was done
some five blocks away from the point of the accident in
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question. It was but a remote cause and did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible. The negligence of
the defendants Clawsons in failing to see that the wheel was
properly secured and in driving and operating the truck at
a speed too high for the condition of the road were such
distinct, successive and unrelated and efficient causes as
to relieve the Lang Company, if it were negligent in the
first instance, from any liability whatsoever.
In the case of Williams vs. Weidman, 135 Mich. 444,
97 N. W. 966, a butcher sold a beef carcass to a retailer
without notice that the beef was infected. The retailer's
clerk was cutting the carcass up and got blood poisoning.
The court held that the act of the butcher in selling the beef
was not the proximate cause of the clerk getting blood poisoning when he discovered the putrid condition of the carcass
before he attempted to cut the same.
See also the case of Furlong vs. Roberts, 164 App. Div.
458, 1'50 N. Y. S. 166, where the defendant laid a beam
23. feet long and ten inches square and weighing about 800
lbs. on the south side of a street to defend the supports of
a wooden bridge over the street. The beam was not fastened
or anchored in any way and an express wagon passing
through the street collided with the end of the beam and
pushed it along so that it struck and injured plaintiff. The
court held that the laying of the beam in the street and the
failure to secure it was not the proximate cause of the injury as the striking thereof by the wagon was an independent, intervening cause. So in the case at bar the placing
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of the wheel upon the truck by the Lang Company cannot
possibly be a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff.
The driving of the truck by the defendant, Julion Clawson,
Jr. over a bumpy road at a high speed which could not
be foreseen by the Lang Company. It could not possibly
know that the driver would not exercise due care.
An interesting case and one which is directly in point
with the case at bar is the case of Baughn vs. Plq,tt, 123 Texas
486, 72 S. W. (2nd) 580. There the action was brought
to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have
resulted from the negligence of two or more defendants.
One of the defendants was the owner and driver of a truck,
the other defendants owned an ice company. The defendant
driver stopped his truck at the ice plant of the defendant
Ice Company and purchased a 100 pound block of ice which
employees of the ice company placed on the right running
board of defendant driver's car and tied the same with common binding twine. The defendant driver then proceeded
towards his home some four miles away. The road was paved
and about twenty feet wide but was made so as to slope
away from the center. Plaintiff was walking on the right
hand side of the road approximately eight feet from the
paved portion when the defendant driver overtook him
while he was driving between 30 to 35 miles per hour. The
road was rough and bumpy at the point where defenaant
driver overtook plaintiff and the ice slid from the running
board across the road, striking the plaintiff. The string
around the ice had come untied but had not broken.
The Ice Company contended that the act of its servant
in depositing the ice on the running board of the car, in-
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eluding the manner in which it was tied was too remote
from the event of the plaintiff's injuries to be considered
the proximate cause thereof. The court held that it could
not be said that the putting of the ice on the running board,
including the attendant circumstances was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries.
The court in discussing proximate case, stated that in
order to warrant a finding that an injury is the proximate
result of an act of negligence whether by commission or
omission, it must appear that the injury was the natural and
probable consequence of the negligent act complained of and
that the party committing the negligent act ought to have
foreseen such consequences in the light of the attending circumstances.
The court further said,
"When we come to apply the rule above announced to the facts of this case, we are convinced
that the event of the depositing of the ice on the running board of the car including the manner of tying it
by the servant of the Ice Company was too far removed, that is too remote from the event of plaintiff's
injury to permit it to be said that the former was the
proximate cause of the latter. In other words we think
it can not be said that the servant of the Ice Company
ought to have anticipated or foreseen that his act
would result in plaintiff's injuries. In connection
with the above, we call your attention to the fact that
at all times here involved, defendant driver was his
own master. The Ice Company had no control over
him or his car. They had no authority to direct or
suggest how he should drive going to his home or to
direct the manner in which he should drive. The defendant driver knew the ice was resting on the run-
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ning board and was only tied with binding twine.
He was the master and in full and exclusive control of
· his own car on which he was transporting his own
ice and while he was traveling fast over a rough and
bumpy road."
The case at bar is even stronger than the above cited
case. In the case at bar the Lang Company employees were
merely accommodating the defendants Clawsons in placing
the wheel in the position in which they did. They had not
purchased the wheel from The Lang Company as had the
plaintiff purchased the ice in the above cited case. The
employees of the ice Company were certainly in the course
of their employment in placing the ice upon the plaintiff's
car but in the case at bar the placing of the wheel upon the
defendant Clawson's truck was without the scope of the
employees of The Lang Company authority and was at most
a mere accommodation to the defendant Clawsons and the
Livestock Co.
The defendant Julion Clawson, Jr. was in full control
of the truck which he was driving. The Lang Company had
no right to tell him the road to drive upon or the manner
in which he should drive his truck.
The defendant, Julion Clawson, Jr. knew that the wheel
was not fastened in any manner and at no time during his
drive over the bump road did he take time to see whether
the wheel was still riding safely on the truck.
Another interesting case and a case which throws a
great deal of light on the situation involved in the case at
the bar is the case of Looney vs. Bingham Dairy, et al., 75
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Utah 5·3, 282 Pac. 1030, 73 A. L. R. 327. In that case the
plaintiff was requested by an employee of the Dairy Company to help drive one of the Dairy Company's horses into
the barn. The plaintiff went behind the horse in an effort
to get it in the barn when the horse suddenly kicked him
in the face. The plaintiff contends that the defendant Dairy
Company was negligent in temporarily leaving the horse
loose and unattended in the barn yard. The court held, however, that it was the unauthorized act of the defendant employee in requesting the plaintiff to drive the horse in the
barn that caused the injuries and that had'it not been for the
unauthorized act of the employee the injury would not have
happened. In other words, this Honorable Court held that
assuming the Dairy Company was negligent in the first
instance in leaving the horse untied and loose in the barn
yard, still it was the intervening unauthorized act of the
Dairy Company employee in requesting the plaintiff to drive
the horse into the barn that was responsible for the injuries
to plaintiff.
It is clear from the foregoing authorities that in order
to hold two or more persons as joint tort feasors, their acts
must proximately cause or contribute to the accident and
resulting injury; that where a prior and remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion and there is an intervening act between such prior
or remote cause and the injury, a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury, then the prior and
remote cause cannot be said to be the proximate cause of
the injury and the parties will not be considered joint tort
feasors.
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The case at bar clearly falls within the rule announced
by the above cases. The act of The Lang Company, even
though it can be said to have been a negligent act, was one
which was so remote from the time of the accident that it
cannot be said to be a contributing cause thereto. The intervening acts of the defendant Julion Clawson, Jr. was one
which could not be anticipated by the Lang Company nor
was it one which it could control and was such an act as to
cut off the negligence of The Lang Company if any, and
place the responsibility solely upon the Livestock Company
and the Clawsons. Thus it is apparent that the trial court
erred in making and entering its finding of fact and conclusion of law to the effect that all of the defendants were joint
tort feasors and this Honorable Court should make and
enter its order directing the trial court to make and enter
its findings, conclusions and judgment as prepared and submitted by the plaintiff and allow the plaintiff the full amount
of the judgment entered solely against the Livestock Company and the Ciawsons.
That the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the
Livestock Company and the Clawsons cannot be questioned.
They were the owners of the truck and wheel in question and
the same were under their exclusive jurisdiction and control, and the falling of the wheel from the truck was something that in the ordinary course of events would not have
happened had the Livestock Company and the Clawsons exercised that degree of care required of them. An inference
or presumption of negligence arises from the falling of tne
wheel and the striking of the same against the plaintiff.
That the doctrine applies, see the following cases:
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Furkovich vs. Bingham Coal and Lumber Company, 45 Utah 89, 143 Pacific 121,
Angerman vs. Edgeman, 7·6 Utah 394, 290 Pacific 169,
Laos vs. Mt. Fuel Supply Company, et al., 108
Pac. (2nd) 254,
Hayward vs. Downing and Wright vs. Downing,
189 Pac. (2nd) 442.
There is no question but what the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur would not have applied to the Lang Company and
there is no showing by the defendants nor is there any evidence in the record whatsoever that the Lang Company did
not follow the instructions as to the loading of the wheel as
given them by the defendant, Julion Clawson, Sr., nor is
there any evidence that the same could have been loaded by
them any differently than it was.
The defendants, the Livestock Company and Clawsons
are desirous, of course, in holding The Lang Company and
assert its negligence contributed to plaintiff's injuries. We
have heretofore shown that whatever negligence there was
on the part of The Lang Company was not a proximate cause
of the accident in question. If The Lang Company were
negligent, its negligence was only a remote cause for which
it could not be held liable. It, in no sense, could be considered a joint tort feasor. The court in its Findings makes
The Lang Company a joint tort feasor and says:
"That the employees of said Lang Company so
negligently placed said wheel between the back of the
cab and a stake projecting from a slot that it was not
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so firmly fixed as to remain in place if there should
be any movement of the pipes loaded as aforesaid;
and that the Lang Company knew, or in the exercise
of reasonable care should have known that said loaded
pipes would shift their position in transit and would
cause said wheel to be hurled from said truck and
onto the ground." (See the Findings of Fact by the
Court, Tr. 46.)

The finding "that the employees of said Lang Company
so negligently placed said wheel between the back of the
~,
cab and the stake projecting from a slot that it was not so
firmly fixed as to remain in place if there should be any
movement of the pipes loaded as aforesaid," is but a mere
·- conclusion. There is no evidence whatever to justify the
finding that it was "negligently placed" between the back
-- of the cab and the stake. So far as the evidence shows, there
was no other place that the wheel could be placed.

The court further found (Par. 6, Tr. 47) that the defendant Julion Clawson, Jr. drove the truck at a rate of
- speed that was not reasonable or proper under the circumstances and he was guilty of negligence in driving at such
>
rate of speed in view of the condition of the highway and
.:· the load upon said truck and the manner in which said wheel
was placed thereon. That finding, of course, is supported
· c
by the evidence. If that finding is correct then it must have
:p: been the negligence of Julion Clawson, Jr., in driving the
truck in such manner that he did over the rough road that
was the proximate cause of the accident in question. That
::~ being the case, there was no negligence of the Lang Com;j:
pany that could proximately contribute to the accident in
~~;
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question. Julion Clawson, Jr., had assisted in the loading
of the wheel (Tr. 78). He knew the manner in which it was
loaded. He had asked the employee of The Lang Company
who loaded it if it was safe and the employee replied
that he thought it was. Julion Clawson, Jr., testified that
the pavement was very rough and jolty and that it was so
rough and jolty that the pipes would move and go against
the wheel and knock it loose (Tr. 89~90). In view of that
testimony, how can it be said that The Lang Company was
a joint tort feasor? The witness further testified that he
never, at any time after leaving The Lang Company, examined the load or the wheel to see how the wheel or the
pipes were riding (Tr. 90).
Further, the manner in which the truck was reloaded
and the way the wheel was placed on the truck was well
known to the defendants, Livestock Company and the Clawsons. Those defendants cannot be heard to say that J ulion
Clawson, Jr., was a young boy and did not fully understand
how the loading should be done. He was the agent of his
father and also the Livestock Company. He was sent to The
Lang Company for the purpose of having the pipe reloaded
and of taking the load away. His negligence cannot in any
way be attributed to The Lang Company, and even though
this Court should find that the employees of The Lang Company had authority to load the wheel and that it was not
properly loaded, still this Court cannot say, in view of the
evidence, that the failure of employees of The Lang Company
in any manner or form proximately contributed to the ac-cident in question. Under the statute, Title 47, Sections
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{ 4-0-1 to 4-0-5 U. C. A. 1943, the amount of the consideration received from one or more of the joint tort feasors can
be credited pro tanto to the other joint tort feasors. But,
in order that a joint tort feasor be allowed the credit paid
by the other, the parties must stand in the relation of joint
tort feasors to the injured person. In other words, the negligence of the tort feasors must have proximately contributed
to the injuries. The obligation must be joint. It must be a
case where the injured person could sue and obtain a judgment against any one or all of the tort feasors. If the plaintiff had attempted to hold The Lang Company alone, would
this Court have upheld a judgment obtained against it under
the undisputed evidence in the case. The mere fact that the
plaintiff did finally join The Lang Company as a defendant
is no evidence that it is a joint tort feasor. The fact that
The Lang Company was willing to buy its peace and pay
plaintiff a consideration to dismiss the action against it
and obtain a covenant not to sue is not evidence that The
Lang Company is liable as a joint tort feasor or otherwise.
A perusal of the evidence will not disclose any negligence whatever on the part of The Lang Company, and if
there were negligence it is so remote that it has no causal
connection with the accident and the resulting injuries to
the plaintiff.

... ·
;):

:....

We respectfully submit that this Court should order the
trial court to vacate that portion of the judgment wherein
the trial court allowed credit to the Livestock Company and
the Clawsons of $1,2,50.00 paid by The Lang Company and
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should require the trial court to enter judgment against the
defendants, the Leonard Chipman Livestock Company, Julion Clawson, Sr., and Julion Clawson, Jr., for the entire
amount of damages which the court found had been sustained by the plaintiff, to wit, $3,030.00.

Respectfully submitted,
WILLARD HANSON,
STEWART M. HANSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
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